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NOTES
Eat Your Vitamins and Say Your
Prayers: Bollea v. Gawker, Revenge
Litigation Funding, and the Fate of the
Fourth Estate
NICOLE K. CHIPI*
In August 2016, Gawker.com shut down after 14 years of—more
often than not—controversial online publishing. The website was
one of several Gawker Media properties crushed under the weight
of a $140 million jury verdict awarded to Terry Bollea (better known
as former professional wrestler Hulk Hogan), in a lawsuit financed
by eccentric Silicon Valley billionaire Peter Thiel. Thiel’s clandestine legal campaign was part of a vendetta against Gawker Media,
a venture he confirms was singularly focused on bankrupting the
company through litigation. His success sent shudders through the
media world, demonstrating that determined actors with deep pockets could sue the Fourth Estate out of existence.
This Note explores the strategy employed by actors like Thiel,
who have weaponized third-party litigation funding as a means of
attacking and silencing an already weakened free press. While these
*
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“revenge litigation funding” schemes are fueled by the same kind of
nefarious ends that underlie the rationale of champerty and maintenance—the legal doctrines that historically restricted third-party
litigation funding—their protections do not sufficiently address the
issue. This Note suggests additional avenues by which this threat
might be ameliorated, including the adoption of stronger antiSLAPP statutes, increased regulation of third-party litigation funding, and amendments to the discovery rules that would more readily
unveil the presence of a vengeful funder.
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INTRODUCTION
Third-party litigation funding is most simply defined as a practice through which an external party, who has no other connection
with the litigation, funds a litigant’s case.1 Traditionally banned by
the common law doctrines of champerty and maintenance, thirdparty litigation funding has seen a modern resurgence in Australia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.2 While the practice has
1

See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is this Anyway? Third-Party Litigation
Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1275–76 (2011).
2
Id. at 1278–81.
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steadily gained prominence in the U.S. among sophisticated investors, it became the subject of intense media scrutiny following the
revelation that eccentric Silicon Valley billionaire Peter Thiel had
secretly bankrolled several cases against Gawker Media—one of
which resulted in the bankruptcy and permanent dismantling of the
news site.3
Though litigation funding industry experts have been quick to
dismiss the case as an “outlier,”4 this Note will examine the implications of allowing third-party litigation funding to be used by
vengeful actors targeting news media. This Note will particularly
focus on the so-called “chilling effect”5 of the Bollea v. Gawker
award, and the effect the practice could have on the future of the
Fourth Estate.
Part I will provide a brief overview of the historical restrictions
against third-party litigation funding and the modern manifestation
of the practice in foreign jurisdictions and the United States. Part II
will recount relevant portions of the Bollea v. Gawker Media controversy, including Peter Thiel’s vendetta against Gawker, and the
means through which he bankrolled claims against the news site.
Part III will examine how Thiel’s model of “revenge litigation funding” is impervious to normal market constraints that typically apply
to the threat of meritless claims, the chilling effect he and other actors have had on press coverage, and how the threat to the Fourth
Estate might be ameliorated through the protections afforded by the
legal rationale underlying traditional doctrines of champerty and
maintenance. This Note will conclude with suggestions for other potential regulatory, procedural, and legislative defenses against revenge litigation funding tactics.

3
See Sara Randazzo, Hulk Hogan Case Stirs Funding-Disclosure Debate,
WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2016, 1:48 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hulk-hogancase-stirs-funding-disclosure-debate-1464371324.
4
See id.
5
See Vivek Wadhwa, The Chilling Effect Peter Thiel’s Battle with Gawker
Could Have on Silicon Valley Journalism, WASH. POST (May 27, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/05/27/the-chilling-effectpeter-thiels-battle-with-gawker-could-have-on-silicon-valley-journalism/?utm_
term=.c54360755951.
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I.

THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING: A LEGACY OF
RESTRICTION AND A MODERN REBIRTH
The practice of third-party litigation funding is best understood
first by defining the common law doctrines that have traditionally
prohibited the practice, and then by exploring the modern manifestations of the practice in the United States and abroad.
Third-party litigation funding refers to funding methods that employ resources from insurance markets, capital markets, or a private
fund in lieu of a litigant’s own funds. This is distinguished from the
analogous (and commonplace) practice of contingency fees,
whereby an attorney agrees to accept payment contingent upon the
outcome of the case.6 This term should also be understood as distinct
from “consumer” third-party litigation funding, which traditionally
involves an individual plaintiff (often in a personal injury case) who
seeks funding for his or her claim, typically in the form of an advance.7 A typical third-party funding arrangement would consist of
a specialist finance company or hedge fund paying a firm’s fees on
an interim basis in exchange for a promised percentage of the award,
up to an agreed cap.8 Typically, the funder will contract directly with
the client, though agreements between funder and attorney are also
employed.9
Revenge litigation funding, on the other hand, should be understood to describe the tactic employed by actors like Thiel, who seek
to utilize the vehicle of third-party litigation funding to weaponize
Contingent fee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
See Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West
of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55,
63 (2004). These “consumer” lending operations have often engaged in predatory
lending schemes, akin to the kind of subprime mortgage lending that led to the
recent housing crisis and subsequent recession. Id. at 63–64. While they undoubtedly merit academic scrutiny, the practice is beyond the scope of what should be
understood as third-party litigation funding within the meaning of this article.
8
See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1275–76.
9
See id. at 1276. The structure of the funding arrangement utilized in the
case discussed herein is unknown. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Peter Thiel, Tech
Billionaire, Reveals Secret War with Gawker, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (May 25,
2016), http://nyti.ms/1sbe6AU. Significantly, it is not known whether Peter Thiel
was reimbursed for the costs associated with litigation (which are speculated to
hover around $10 million), or if he received an additional percentage of the award
recovered. Id.
6
7

2017]

REVENGE LITIGATION FUNDING & THE FOURTH ESTATE

273

torts against a specific target (in Thiel’s case, Gawker Media). Unlike typical third-party litigation funders, revenge litigation funders
are not necessarily interested in a return on investment, but instead
hope to use the legal system to carry out their own vendettas.10
A.
Historical Restriction: Champerty and Maintenance
Put broadly, the definition of maintenance in common law is “an
officious intermeddling in a suit which in no way belongs to the intermeddler by maintaining or assisting either party to the action,
with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it.”11 From the Old
French champart,12 champerty is a specific form of maintenance in
which an agreement is made to divide the proceeds of litigation between the owner of the claim and an unrelated party who supports
the claim.13 The concepts of champerty and maintenance have origins in ancient Greek and Roman law,14 but first appeared in English
law in a series of statutes by Edward I, who decreed them criminal
offenses.15 At the time, the prohibition of these practices was primarily intended to prevent the abuse of judicial processes, particularly by feudal lords.16 Significantly, the doctrine was also introduced to counteract support from disinterested third parties who
could encourage or support litigation out of malicious intent towards
a rival.17 These nobles and land barons would often use their titles
to intimidate the courts and aggrandize their own estates, typically
by lending their names to claims in which they had no legitimate
interest, in return for a share of the property recovered. 18 In other
words, the development of the doctrine of champerty was motivated
See Sorkin, supra note 9. Per Thiel: “[w]ithout going into all the details,
we would get in touch with the plaintiffs who otherwise would have accepted a
pittance for a settlement, and they were obviously quite happy to have this sort of
support . . . . I would underscore that I don’t expect to make any money from this.
This is not a business venture.” Id.
11
14 AM. JUR. 2D Champerty, Maintenance, Etc. § 1 (2017).
12
See Ari Dobner, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1544 (1996).
13
Champerty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
14
See Dobner, supra note 12, at 1543.
15
Modern Views of Champerty and Maintenance, 18 HARV. L. REV. 222, 222
(1905).
16
Id. at 223.
17
Id.
18
Id.
10
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by an interest in remedying unjust practices by “great men”19 that
preyed upon a vulnerable judicial system.
B.
The Resurgence of Third-Party Litigation Funding
While many argue that the feudal concerns underlying the development of these doctrines have long since lost their relevance,
modern policy rationale in support of restrictions against champerty
reflect some of the same preoccupations.20 For example, an oft-cited
motivation for laws against these doctrines is a desire to deter frivolous, unnecessary, or speculative litigation.21 Likewise, courts have
upheld champerty restrictions out of a desire to prevent unfair dealings—particularly in situations where a party in a dominant bargaining position is afforded excessive profits by its ability to purchase
another party’s claim.22 These public policy preoccupations have led
the majority of common law countries (and states in the United
States) to retain and enforce the prohibition of champerty. 23 Nevertheless, the past two decades have seen a few foreign (and some domestic) jurisdictions—predominantly, Australia and the United
Kingdom—abandon or relax these restrictions, allowing for the development of third-party litigation funding markets.24
In Australia, both the courts and the legislature have taken
strides to relax champerty restrictions.25 In the landmark case on this
issue, Campbells Cash and Carry Pty. Ltd. v. Fostif Pty Ltd., the
Australian high court permitted a third-party funding agreement,
even though the funder had broad control over the course of litigation.26 In that case, the funder sought out small tobacco retailers as
plaintiffs in a case that would seek the recovery of license fees from
tobacco wholesalers.27 The funding agreement gave the funder con-

19

See Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cow. 623, 644 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824).
See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1288.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 1289.
24
See id. at 1278.
25
See Lee Aitken, Before the High Court: ‘Litigation Lending’ After Fostif,
28 SYDNEY L. REV. 171, 180 (2006).
26
(2006) 229 CLR 386, 388 (Austl.).
27
See id.
20
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trol over the choice of counsel and the right to settle with the defendants for up to 75% of the amount to be claimed.28 The funder
received 33% of the award in exchange for paying all of the costs of
litigation.29
The High Court of Australia considered the practical and ethical
concerns in question, reasoning that the presence of the funder afforded access to justice for the small retailers, who otherwise could
not afford a lawsuit against the wholesalers.30 The court also employed freedom-to-contract rationale, noting that the plaintiff has a
right to enter into a funding agreement, even where it equated to
relinquishing “control” over the claim.31 Since the decision in Fostif,
the High Court of Australia has interpreted the case as a ban on any
rule that would prohibit the funding of litigation in return for an
award, essentially declaring the end of restrictions on champerty and
maintenance.32
In England, the Criminal Law Act of 1967 abolished any criminal or civil liability for champerty, but did not go so far as to affect
rules that would allow for the treatment of contracts as illegal or
contrary to public policy.33 This legislative posture allowed for a
great deal of discretion in the English courts, which tended to carry
forward a relaxed approach to champerty law.34 However, this progressive attitude had its limits. In 2005, the English Court of Appeal
held that while third-party litigation funding agreements are acceptable, the funder should not have control over the management
of litigation.35
Despite this tempered approach, the English Court of Appeal’s
declaration that third-party litigation funding was permissible (and
even a desirable method of improving access to justice) created
“competitive pressures” on law firms based in the United States.36
These pressures, coupled with the effects of the global economic

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1280.
Criminal Law Act 1967, c. 58, § 14 (Eng.).
See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1280–81.
See id. at 1281.
See id. at 1282.

276

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:269

crisis,37 led to a “growing discontent with champerty restrictions”
among certain jurisdictions within the United States.38
As a result, the law of champerty in the United States varies by
jurisdiction.39 While the majority of states retain and enforce champerty restrictions, a growing minority have relaxed or abandoned
them altogether.40 The State of New York, for example, has adopted
a progressive position towards the doctrine, choosing to enforce it
only in cases where an acquisition was made for the express purpose
of bringing an action or proceeding.41 States that have abandoned
the doctrine entirely typically do so under the rationale that it is no
longer needed to protect against the threats of injustice once feared,
citing to ethical rules and procedural safeguards that effectively protect against judicial abuse.42 As stated by one of the most prominent
third-party litigation funding entities in the world, “the reality as to
champerty and its cousins is that modern day litigation has evolved,
and concepts such as Rule 11 and a strong independent judiciary
have taken their place.”43
Nevertheless, in states that continue to enforce champerty laws,
the common law rule is comprised of three essential elements:
(1) the fee of the person who would seek to enforce
the allegedly champertous agreement must come
from the recovery in a successful lawsuit, (2) that
person must have no independent claim to the recovery fund, and (3) the costs and expenses must be
borne by that person with no expectation of reimbursement from the other party to the allegedly
champertous agreement.44
On its face, the typical third-party funding arrangement described herein would seem to satisfy these elements. And, when
37

See id. at 1283.
See id. at 1290.
39
See id. at 1289.
40
See id.
41
Id. at 1289–90.
42
See id. at 1290.
43
Litigation Finance Is Not Champerty, Maintenance or Barratry, BURFORD
CAP. (July 30, 2013), http://www.burfordcapital.com/blog/litigation-finance-notchamperty-maintenance-barratry/.
44
7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15.1 (4th ed.).
38
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evaluating a potentially champertous agreement, courts that continue to apply the doctrine appear unmoved by the logic of states
that are satisfied by the existence of modern alternative safeguards.45
For example, in 2004, the Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed a
respondent’s appeal raising such arguments, noting that though
these alternatives might “alleviate the potential evils associated with
champertous agreements,” they do not stand as a compelling argument to abandon the champerty doctrine entirely, even if a few states
have seen fit to do so.46
Though the existence of champerty restrictions in a given jurisdiction may foster hesitation in those seeking to engage in thirdparty litigation funding agreements, decisions in states that hold fast
to the doctrine suggest that the two are not mutually exclusive.47 In
a recent decision from the Superior Court of Delaware (a state that
enforces champerty restrictions48), the court held that a third-party
litigation funding agreement was not champertous because, among
other reasons, the third-party funder had not encouraged the plaintiff
“to enforce claims which [it was] not disposed to prosecute.” 49 The
court reasoned that because champerty “is based upon the ground
that no encouragement should be given to litigation by the introduction of a party to enforce those rights which the owners are not disposed to prosecute,” to be champertous, the third-party funder
would have to encourage the party to the claim to introduce or enforce claims it was not interested in pursuing originally.50
Moreover, the Delaware court held that the funder did not qualify as an “officious intermeddler” because the party holding the
claim sought out their assistance (rather than the funder seeking out

45

See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1289.
Johnson v. Wright, 628 N.W.2d 671, 680 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
47
See, e.g., Charge Injection Techs., Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co.,
No. NO7C–12–134–JRJ, 2016 WL 937400, at *1, *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 9,
2016). The court also noted that the agreement was not champertous because the
claim was not assigned to the funder. Id.
48
See, e.g., Hall v. State, 655 A.2d 827, 830 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994) (emphasis
added) (quoting another source); see also Street Search Partners, L.P. v. Ricon
Int’l, L.L.C., No. 04C–09–191–PLA, 2006 WL 1313859, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct.
May 12, 2006).
49
See Charge Injection Tech., Inc., 2016 WL 937400, at *4.
50
Id.
46
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potential plaintiffs).51 As the court stressed, the funder’s lack of direction or control over the litigation was significant in its decision
that the funding agreement did not violate champerty and maintenance doctrines.52 Specifically, the court noted that the third-party
funder was not an officious intermeddler within the meaning of the
maintenance doctrine because they had not “‘stirred up’ litigation”
and was not “controlling the litigation for the purpose of continuing
a frivolous or unwanted lawsuit.”53
Conversely, a recent decision in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania has left the fate of third-party litigation funding agreements in
that jurisdiction uncertain.54 In WFIC, LLC v. Labarre, the court
held that a complex third-party litigation funding agreement met the
definition of champerty.55 The case arose when an attorney working
on a contingency basis in an underlying matter restructured the contingency fee agreement so that he would receive 33% of the award
as his fee, with the provision that repayment of the third-party litigation funder would come from his share.56 When the attorney’s client lost an appeal for a larger award in the case, the attorney was left
without any compensation for his work after litigation funders were
paid their portion of the award.57 As a result, the attorney sued the
funder to recover the fees he believed he was due, arguing that his
fee should be considered a lien against the client’s recovery and, as
such, should have been paid before the investors.58 The court disagreed, holding that the funding agreement was champertous and that
the attorney was entitled to nothing.59
While LaBarre is perhaps distinguished by the fact that the underlying agreement was unusually complex, the court’s rationale
that it was champertous because “[t]he requisite elements of champerty have all clearly been met” is quite broad, providing little guidance as to when and whether the doctrine will apply.60 A lawyer who
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
See WFIC, LLC v. Labarre, 148 A.3d 812, 819 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
Id.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 815–16.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 819.
Id.
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represented the funder in the case observed that the court seemed
“concerned about whether the lawyer had a controlling say in the
resolution of the litigation,” but also noted that the implication for
third-party litigation funding in Pennsylvania “remains to be
seen.”61
In sum, despite what has been described as a “growing discontent” with the doctrines of champerty and maintenance in jurisdictions across the United States,62 the doctrines remain among the
greatest obstacles for those who wish to see the expansion of the
third-party litigation funding industry.63 However, the patchwork of
jurisdictions enforcing these restrictions (and the mélange of interpretations of the doctrine in those jurisdictions) creates a great deal
of uncertainty regarding their effect on the legality of third-party
funding agreements in the United States. These nuanced approaches
aside, jurisdictions that enforce champerty and maintenance restrictions appear to be, at the very least, in agreement that courts
should not uphold third-party litigation funding arrangements that
allow for funders to meddle in the management and strategy of litigation. This specific preoccupation is echoed by the numerous ethics
rules that demand an attorney exercise independent professional
judgment, free from financial or other considerations.64 This apparent united front against third-party meddling will prove significant
to the discussion of the implications of Bollea v. Gawker Media,
particularly as it pertains to the chain of events that led to the realization that a third-party litigation funder was at play in the case.
61

Alison Frankel, Pennsylvania Appeals Court Tosses Litigation Funding
Deal as Champerty, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2016/10/05/pennsylvania-appeals-court-tosses-litigation-funding-dealas-champerty/.
62
See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1290.
63
Other threats to the legality of third-party funding agreements include attorney ethics rules that prohibit fee sharing with non-lawyers. See MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 1.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
64
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 5.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N
1983) (“A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays
the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer’s
professional judgment in rendering such legal services.”); see also id. at r. 1.8(f)
(“A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other
than the client unless: (1) the client gives informed consent; (2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship . . . .”).
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II.
BOLLEA V. GAWKER AND PETER THIEL’S VENDETTA
In early 2012, reports began to surface that a sex tape featuring
Terry Bollea, better known as professional wrestler Hulk Hogan,
had been offered for sale to Vivid, an adult entertainment company.65 The footage, which Hogan claims was taken without his
knowledge, captured him in flagrante delicto with a woman named
Heather Clem—the then-wife of his best friend, radio disc jockey
Bubba “the Love Sponge” Clem (“Bubba”).66 Bubba, for his part,
admits to recording the video and burning it onto a DVD (which he
labeled “Hogan”), but denies any involvement in the tape’s release.67
Several months after initial reports of the video’s existence, a
burned DVD copy of the thirty-minute footage was delivered to
Gawker Media through an anonymous source.68 The source reportedly asked for no payment or credit for the video.69 On October 4,
2012, Gawker published a one-minute clip of the thirty-minute
video that included footage of Hogan and Heather Clem engaged in
sexually explicit activity.70 The abridged video generated five million page views on Gawker’s site and was promptly re-posted on
other websites.71
The following day, David Houston—Hogan’s personal attorney—issued a takedown demand requesting that Gawker immediately remove the video from the site.72 Houston added that if Gawker
65
Hulk Hogan Sex Tape Being Shopped, TMZ: SPORTS (Mar. 7, 2012, 1:00
AM), http://www.tmz.com/2012/03/07/hulk-hogan-sex-tape/.
66
Tasneem Nashrulla & Mary Ann Georgantopoulos, “I Was Completely
Humiliated”: Hulk Hogan Testifies About Sex Tape, BUZZFEED: NEWS (Mar. 7,
2016, 12:12 PM), www.buzzfeed.com/tasneemnashrulla/hulk-hogans-lawyersays-gawker-posted-his-sex-tape-for-power?utm_term=.gepp4Kz22#.yirvpJ8rr.
67
Id.
68
A.J. Daulerio, Even for a Minute, Watching Hulk Hogan Have Sex in a
Canopy Bed Is Not Safe for Work but Watch It Anyway, GAWKER (Oct. 4, 2012,
2:15 PM), https://unv.is/gawker.com/5948770/even-for-a-minute-watching-hulkhogan-have-sex-in-a-canopy-bed-is-not-safe-for-work-but-watch-it-anyway#.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Nick Madigan, Hulk Hogan Takes Stand in His Sex-Tape Lawsuit Against
Gawker, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/08/business/media/hulk-hogan-sex-tape-gawker-lawsuit.html.
72
Jeffrey Toobin, Gawker’s Demise and the Trump-era Threat to the First
Amendment, NEW YORKER: ANNALS OF LAW (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.
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removed the video, Hogan would consider the matter resolved and
would not file suit.73 Nick Denton, founder of Gawker Media, refused to take it down.74 With requests for removal falling on deaf
ears, Houston reportedly began to search for a way to force Gawker
to remove the post.75
Enter (notoriously eccentric76) Silicon Valley billionaire, Peter
Thiel. As a co-founder of PayPal,77 and Facebook’s first outside investor, Thiel’s net worth is estimated at $3 billion.78 Through his
venture capital firm, Founders Fund, Thiel also led early investments in platforms like Spotify, Airbnb, Lyft, and Palantir Technologies.79
While Thiel’s investment prowess is well-documented, his
unique—and, at times, polarizing—views are equally storied. Despite the fact that he is a Stanford-educated attorney, Thiel is opposed to higher education and famously established a fellowship
that gives promising students $100,000 to drop out of college.80 A
radical libertarian, Thiel also funded a project that aims to create an

newyorker.com/magazine/2016/12/19/gawkers-demise-and-the-trump-erathreat-to-the-first-amendment.
73
Charles Harder, Hulk Hogan’s Lead Lawyer Explains How His Team Beat
“Arrogant,” “Defiant” Gawker, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Apr. 5, 2016, 7:55 AM),
www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/how-hulk-hogan-beat-gawker-880687.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Max Chafkin & Lizette Chapman, The Strange Politics of Peter Thiel,
Trump’s Most Unlikely Supporter, BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (July 21, 2016,
9:46 AM), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-21/the-strange-politicsof-peter-thiel-trump-s-most-unlikely-supporter.
77
See id. In fact, Thiel is the perceived “ringleader” of the so-called PayPal
Mafia—a cohort of former PayPal colleagues that includes Tesla’s Elon Musk
and LinkedIn’s Reid Hoffman. Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. Palantir Technologies is a $20 billion secretive data-analytics start-up
employed by the likes of the National Security Administration, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Matt Burns, Leaked Palantir Doc Reveals Uses, Specific Functions and Key Clients, TECHCRUNCH (Jan.
11, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/01/11/leaked-palantir-doc-reveals-usesspecific-functions-and-key-clients/.
80
THE THIEL FELLOWSHIP, http://thielfellowship.org/ (last visited Sept. 30,
2017).
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offshore colony that will be free of any governmental interference.81
More recently, Thiel has expressed doubts about the merits of a
democratic society and the benefits of women’s suffrage. 82 He also
famously campaigned for, and contributed to, Donald Trump’s candidacy during the 2016 presidential election—a move met with a
mixture of befuddlement and damnation from his peers, the media,
and the public at large.83
Though Thiel’s public views have garnered considerable criticism from the press, his vendetta against Gawker began in 200784
when the website’s Vallywag blog “outed” him with an article headlined, “Peter Thiel is totally gay, people.”85 To hear Thiel tell it,
Gawker is a “singularly terrible bully” that “ruined people’s lives
for no reason.”86 In fact, Thiel’s disdain for Gawker is such that he
has gone so far as to call the news outlet the “Silicon Valley equivalent of Al Qaeda.”87
In the sole interview granted on the subject, Thiel admitted that
his contempt for Gawker inspired him to fund a team of lawyers (led
by celebrity attorney Charles Harder) to locate and assist other
Gawker “victims” in mounting cases against the news site.88 As fate
would have it, Hogan turned out to be an ideal candidate for Thiel’s
legal assault against Gawker. While Harder’s own account of the

81

THE SEASTEADING INSTITUTE, https://www.seasteading.org/ (last visited
Sept. 30, 2017).
82
Peter Thiel, The Education of a Libertarian, CATO UNBOUND (Apr. 13,
2009), www.cato-unbound.org/2009/04/13/peter-thiel/education-libertarian.
83
Chafkin & Chapman, supra note 76.
84
Sorkin, supra note 9.
85
Owen Thomas, Peter Thiel Is Totally Gay, People, GAWKER: VALLEYWAG
(Dec. 19, 2007, 7:05 PM), http://gawker.com/335894/peter-thiel-is-totally-gaypeople. It is significant to note that Owen Thomas and Gawker Media continue to
contend, despite Thiel’s protestations to the contrary, that the article did not in
fact “out” him. Thiel’s family, friends, and many of his colleagues were already
aware of his sexual orientation. See Nick Denton, An Open Letter to Peter Thiel,
GAWKER (May 26, 2016, 4:35 PM), http://gawker.com/an-open-letter-to-peterthiel-1778991227.
86
Sorkin, supra note 9.
87
Connie Loizos, Peter Thiel on Valleywag; It’s the “Silicon Valley Equivalent of Al Qaeda”, PE HUB (May 18, 2009), https://www.pehub.com/2009/05/peter-thiel-on-valleywag-its-the-silicon-valley-equivalent-of-al-qaeda/.
88
Sorkin, supra note 9.
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trial omits any mention of Thiel’s involvement,89 Thiel ultimately
invested a reported $10 million in the case.90
Though details regarding the manner of Harder’s initial engagement remain unclear, once retained by Hogan, the attorney (and a
legal team that included First Amendment expert David Mirell91)
filed suit in federal court against Gawker Media, its founder Nick
Denton, and then editor-in-chief of Gawker and author of the sex
tape post, A.J. Daulerio.92 Harder filed a second claim in state court
against Bubba and Heather Clem, the couple who recorded Hogan,
allegedly without his knowledge.93 Hogan would eventually settle
his claims against Bubba Clem in exchange for, among other things,
control of the copyright for the sex tape.94
Hogan’s federal suit included claims for invasion of privacy by
intrusion upon seclusion, publication of private facts, violation of
the Florida common law right of publicity, intentional infliction of

89

Harder, supra note 73.
Sorkin, supra note 9.
91
See Drange, infra note 112. Ironically, prior to joining forces with Harder,
Mirell was best known as a defender of the First Amendment. He was perhaps
most famous for arguments against gag orders in the O.J. Simpson trial and as
president of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California. Id. Since their Hogan victory, Harder Mirell & Abrams have become the
premier law firm for celebrities seeking to sue the press, taking on cases for
Melania Trump, Roger Ailes, and even disgraced Hollywood mogul, Harvey
Weinstein. See Alexander Nazaryan, Meet Charles Harder, the Gawker Killer
Now Working for Melania Trump and Roger Ailes, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 14, 2016,
11:19 AM), www.newsweek.com/charles-harder-gawker-melania-trump-rogerailes-people-magazine-509926; see also Dave Simpson, Harvey Weinstein Taps
Glaser Weil Partner After Firing, LAW360 (Oct. 10, 2017, 10:54 PM), www.
law360.com/articles/973163/harvey-weinstein-taps-glaser-weil-partner-after-firing.
92
See Harder, supra note 73. On June 28, 2017, a New York bankruptcy
judge ruled that the Gawker estate could engage in discovery regarding Thiel’s
communications with Harder leading up to the Hogan trial. See Andrew Strickler,
Gawker’s Probe of Thiel Keeps Harsh Light on Legal Funders, LAW360 (July 7,
2017, 5:16 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/941789/gawker-s-probe-ofthiel-keeps-harsh-light-on-legal-funders. As a result of the order, additional details regarding the specifics of Thiel’s arrangement with Hogan may eventually
come to light.
93
Harder, supra note 73.
94
See Toobin, supra note 72.
90
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emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.95
In a press conference held on the day of the filing, Harder announced
that Hogan would seek $100 million in damages, claiming that
Gawker’s actions “exceeded the bounds of human decency.”96 A
few days later, Hogan’s legal team filed a motion for preliminary
injunction that would require Gawker to remove the video posted on
the site.97 A federal district court judge denied Hogan’s request,
along with a subsequent motion seeking injunctive relief on the basis
of a copyright claim.98 In his ruling, Judge James D. Whittemore
hinted he would give deference to Gawker’s argument that the video
was newsworthy, writing that:
Plaintiff’s public persona, including the publicity he
and his family derived from a television reality show
detailing their personal life, his own book describing
an affair he had during his marriage, prior reports by
other parties of the existence and content of the
Video, and Plaintiff’s own public discussion of issues relating to his marriage, sex life, and the Video
all demonstrate that the Video is a subject of general
interest and concern to the community.99
Not to be discouraged, Hogan’s legal team voluntarily dismissed
the federal case and amended the state court claim, adding Gawker
Media, Denton, and Daulerio as defendants, and essentially asserting the same claims as in the federal case.100 Gawker promptly attempted to remove the case to federal court, but the district court
rejected its arguments and remanded the case in favor of Hogan.101

95

See Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1327 (M.D. Fla.

2012).
96
See Harder, supra note 73; see also Ryan Mac & Matt Drange, Behind
Peter Thiel’s Plan to Destroy Gawker, FORBES: TECH (June 7, 2016, 2:51 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2016/06/07/behind-peter-thiel-plan-to-destroy-gawker/#35d90c7a5848.
97
See Bollea, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1327.
98
Toobin, supra note 72.
99
See Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 8:12–cv–02348–T–27TBM, 2012
WL 5509624, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2012).
100
Harder, supra note 73.
101
See Bollea v. Clem, 937 F. Supp. 1344, 1348 (M.D. Fla. 2013).
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Hogan’s request for a preliminary injunction fared better with
the Honorable Pamela A.M. Campbell of the Pinellas County Circuit Court.102 Judge Campbell—who has been reversed on appeal
more times than any of her colleagues in Pinellas County103—
granted the injunction, but failed to make any findings of fact in the
written order to support her decision, or to require Hogan to post a
bond for the injunction as required by Florida law.104 Gawker immediately, and successfully, appealed.105
Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal reversed the injunction, holding that it was an unconstitutional prior restraint under the
First Amendment.106 In an opinion written by Judge Black, the court
seemed to echo Judge Whittemore’s reasoning, finding that:
Mr. Bollea . . . enjoyed the spotlight as a professional
wrestler, and he and his family were depicted in a reality television show detailing their personal lives.
Mr. Bollea openly discussed an affair he had while
married to Linda Bollea . . . and otherwise discussed
his family, marriage, and sex life through various
media outlets. Further, prior to the publication at issue in this appeal, there were numerous reports by
various media outlets regarding the existence and
dissemination of the Sex Tape . . . . It is clear that as
a result of the public controversy surrounding the affair and the Sex Tape, exacerbated in part by Mr.
Bollea himself, the report and the related video excerpts address matters of public concern.107

102

John Cook, A Judge Told Us to Take Down Our Hulk Hogan Sex Tape
Post. We Won’t., GAWKER (Apr. 25, 2013, 4:28 PM), http://gawker.com/a-judgetold-us-to-take-down-our-hulk-hogan-sex-tape-po-481328088.
103
Anna M. Phillips, Trial Judge in Hulk Hogan-Gawker Case Is Most Reversed in Pinellas, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 25, 2016, 5:53 PM), www.tampabay.com/news/courts/trial-judge-in-hulk-hogan-gawker-case-is-most-reversedin-pinellas/2270818.
104
See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA
2014).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
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As noted by commentators, typically a definitive ruling of this
kind would sound the death knell for a case like Hogan’s.108 Two
courts had all but declared that Hogan’s case lacked merit. 109 As a
“single-digit millionaire,”110 he was expected to retreat or, at the
very least, settle his claims rather than commit to what was sure to
be a lengthy—and expensive—trial against Gawker in state court.111
But what Gawker failed to appreciate was that Hogan’s legal
team planned to go the distance, equipped with a veritable blank
check from Thiel, their silent benefactor.112 Denton, however, had
begun to suspect that someone was behind the lawsuit.113 A few
things tipped Thiel’s hand,114 the most significant being that Hogan
dropped his claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress—a
tactic that freed Gawker’s insurance company from liability in the
case and ensured that any award would need to come directly from
the news site’s own pockets.115
Denton’s suspicions aside, the case proceeded to trial in Pinellas
County Circuit Court, where it reached new theatrical heights.116
Now in state court, Gawker faced the difficult task of convincing a
jury of local citizens that publishing a sexually explicit video featuring Hogan—a hometown hero—served a legitimate and newsworthy purpose.117 Harder and his legal team flexed their home-court
108

See Toobin, supra note 72.
See id.
110
Eriq Gardner, Peter Thiel Explains His Backing of “Single-Digit Millionaire” Hulk Hogan, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 31, 2016, 10:15 AM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/peter-thiel-explains-his-backing-single-digit-millionaire-hulk-hogan-942506. Thiel expressed his concern for Hogan’s “plight,” stating “‘[i]f you’re a single-digit millionaire like Hulk Hogan, you
have no effective access to our legal system . . . It costs too much.’”
111
See Toobin, supra note 72.
112
Matt Drange, Hulk Hogan’s Lawyers Have Made Suing Gawker Their
‘Bread and Butter’, FORBES: TECH (May 30, 2016, 1:45 PM), www.forbes.com/
sites/mattdrange/2016/05/30/peter-thiel-hulk-hogan-lawyers-charles-harder/
#2d53f290108e.
113
See Mac & Drange, supra note 96.
114
See id. Hogan had recently been through an expensive divorce and it was
doubtful he could afford a high-powered Hollywood attorney like Harder on what
seemed to be a bleak case. Id. Hogan also refused several offers of settlement. Id.
115
Id.
116
See Toobin, supra note 72.
117
Id.
109
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advantage, crafting a narrative that cast Hogan as a local, hardworking man who “made good” only to be torn down by a group of elitist
bullies (Gawker).118 Gawker’s lawyers countered by highlighting
(as Judge Black and Judge Whittemore had) that Hogan had made
his personal life public by bragging about private matters such as his
sexual prowess, penis size, and extramarital affairs in his own book
and in interviews.119 In response, Hogan, who received special permission from Judge Campbell to wear his trademark bandana in
court, testified that disclosures regarding personal aspects of his life,
including his sexual escapades, were made when he was in “character” as Hulk Hogan, and were therefore separate from the private
details of his life as Terry Bollea.120
The six-person jury apparently found credence in this argument.121 After a ten-day trial and a few hours of deliberation, Hogan
was awarded $115 million in damages,122 and an additional $15 million in punitive damages.123 Gawker filed an appeal in state court,
but with its coffers exhausted after several years of litigation, the
company also filed for bankruptcy: a shield that would prevent it
from having to pay the multi-million-dollar judgment.124
In an ironic twist, after more than four years in court and several
rejected offers of settlement, on November 2, 2016, Hogan and
Gawker Media announced a tentative settlement in the amount of
$31 million.125 The settlement, funded by proceeds from Gawker
Media’s sale to Univision Communications, also included a stipulation that Gawker would forgo an appeal.126 As part of the sale to

118

Id.
Id.
120
Id. As some commentators have noted, given his insistence on wearing his
trademark bandana, even in the courtroom, and the unrestricted access he granted
to his personal life via discussions with the media and a literal reality show about
his family, “it seems more logical to assume that [Bollea’s] primary identity is
that of Hulk Hogan.” See Fabio Bertoni, The Stakes in Hulk Hogan’s Gawker
Lawsuit, NEW YORKER (Mar. 23, 2016) https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/the-stakes-in-hulk-hogans-gawker-lawsuit.
121
See Toobin, supra note 72.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
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Id.
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Univision, Gawker has been permanently shuttered.127 In the wake
of the case (and Gawker’s ultimate demise), media and legal commentators have pondered what effect the success of Thiel’s innovative revenge tactic might have on the future of the “Fourth Estate.”128
THE RISE OF “REVENGE LITIGATION FUNDING” AND THE
FATE OF THE FOURTH ESTATE
Bollea v. Gawker and the debate surrounding Thiel’s actions unfolded against a backdrop of exceptional vulnerability for the press
at large. The past decade has seen unprecedented decline in media
revenue, a phenomenon that has left even storied institutions struggling to maintain their ability to produce hard-hitting investigative
journalism.129 This moment of acute financial weakness is coupled
with a decline in American confidence in the press.130 According to
a recent Gallup survey, only 40% of Americans say they have “a
great deal” or even “a fair amount” of “trust and confidence in the
mass media to report the news fully, accurately and fairly.”131 While
the data reflects that this distrust has grown slowly over the past
III.

127
Id. It is significant to note that until the Bollea verdict, Gawker was one of
the largest self-funded media entities in the United States, with annual revenues
of $50 million. See Matthew Ingram, Why the Death of Gawker Isn’t Something
to Cheer About, FORTUNE: TECH (Aug. 18, 2016), fortune.com/2016/08/18/deathof-gawker/.
128
See Emily Bazelon, Billionaires vs. the Press in the Era of Trump, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Nov. 22, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2ghfxJw; Monika Bauerlein & Clara
Jeffery, Thiel, Trump, and the Billionaires’ Attack on the Fourth Estate, MOTHER
JONES (June 15, 2016, 5:54 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/
thiel-trump-vandersloot-lawsuit [hereinafter Billionaires’ Attack]; see also Amy
Gajda, The Present of Newsworthiness, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. 145, 159 (2016).
129
See Michael Barthel, State of the News Media 2016, PEW RES. CTR.:
JOURNALISM & MEDIA (June 15, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/06/15/
newspapers-fact-sheet/; see also Billionaires’ Attack, supra note 128.
130
See Rebecca Riffkin, Americans’ Trust in Media Remains at Historical
Low, GALLUP (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/185927/americanstrust-media-remains-historical-low.aspx.
131
Id.

2017]

REVENGE LITIGATION FUNDING & THE FOURTH ESTATE

289

decade,132 recent surveys suggest that, in the wake of the 2016 presidential election, trust in the media continues to rapidly plummet.133
This Part will argue that the unique threat posed by vindictive
actors seeking to weaponize the legal system as a means of silencing
unwanted criticism is not sufficiently ameliorated by current libel
laws, laws intended to prevent abusive litigation tactics that silence
critics,134 our modern legal system, or attorneys’ ethics rules. The
importance of laws that protect against this kind of attack on the
Fourth Estate will be explored through the American tradition of
pro-press free expression, the “chilling effect” of cases like Bollea
v. Gawker, and the building sentiment of hostility toward the press
in the wake of the election of Donald Trump. Particular attention
will be given to the argument that the presence of a third-party funder is irrelevant because only claims that have merit pose a threat to
media outlets. This Part will conclude with an analysis that demonstrates how the application of traditional views of champerty and
maintenance doctrines might be employed (or adopted via regulation) to protect against the kind of revenge litigation funding employed by actors like Thiel.
The “Chilling Effect” and Press Coverage in the Era of
Trump
The American tradition of freedom of the press is reflected not
only in the protections granted by the First Amendment, but also in
the rigors of American media law. The role of the Fourth Estate as
a check on abuses of power (from governmental and private forces
alike), coupled with the sanctity of the First Amendment, motivates
courts to disfavor actions that “chill” the freedom of the press and
A.

132

Id.
See As Election Nears, Voters Divided Over Democracy and ‘Respect’,
PEW RES. CTR.: U.S. POL. & POL’Y (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.people-press.org/
2016/10/27/as-election-nears-voters-divided-over-democracy-and-respect/ [hereinafter Voters Divided].
134
See generally GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING
SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT (1996). SLAPP lawsuits are not only lawsuits for libel
and defamation, but have also been brought against those exercising First Amendment rights in the form of business interference and conspiracy. Id. at 3.
133
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journalists’ willingness to exercise free speech rights to satisfy their
duty.135
This protective stance is most clearly demonstrated in the most
important case in American media law, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.136 In Sullivan, Justice William Brennan wrote that the Constitution prohibits a federal rule that would allow for a public official
to recover damages for a defamatory falsehood unless he proves that
the statement was made with actual malice.137 This high bar, coupled
with a trend in libel suits favoring outcomes for the defendant,138
created a major deterrent for plaintiffs and their lawyers seeking to
harass media outlets with specious claims.139
Laws barring attack against First Amendment protected press
activity also manifest in the form of anti-SLAPP statutes.140 A
SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) is an action
brought not with the goal of litigating the underlying claim, but with
the primary purpose of suppressing First Amendment protected activity.141 The statutes that protect the right to comment on and participate in matters of public concern are rooted in First Amendment
principles.142 As seen in Hogan’s case,143 what constitutes a matter
of public concern is not particularly well defined. But generally, a
matter qualifies as one of public concern when it is the subject of
135

See, e.g., Multimedia Holdings Corp. v. Circuit Court of Fla., 544 U.S.
1301, 1304 (2005) (noting that in the context of criminal statutes “threat of prosecution . . . raises special First Amendment concerns, for it may chill protected
speech much like an injunction against speech by putting that party at an added
risk of liability”).
136
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
137
Id. at 282.
138
See Bazelon, supra note 128.
139
See id.
140
See Pring & Canan, supra note 134, at 189.
141
Id. at 3.
142
See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004).
143
See Toobin, supra note 72. The salacious nature of the tape left many hesitant to defend Gawker’s actions. In fact, Thiel’s characterization of the site as a
bully is not one that most reputable news sources would disagree with. But despite
the potentially offensive or objectionable nature of its reporting, in financing the
case that effectively shut Gawker down, leaving hundreds of staffers and journalist out of work, Thiel achieved “the impossible: [he] made us sympathize with
Gawker.” See Jack Shafer, Peter Thiel Does the Impossible!, POLITICO: FOURTH
ESTATE (May 25, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/
gawker-peter-thiel-fourth-estate-213918.
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“great interest and of value and concern to the public”144 without
regard to whether the commentary in question is “inappropriate or
controversial.”145 In considering the outcome of Bollea, it is significant to note that it is common for judges to dismiss lawsuits when
the plaintiffs themselves have encouraged news interest in the matter they claim is private.146
The majority of states have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes that
shield individuals and the press from attacks by those seeking to silence their critics.147 Among other things, anti-SLAPP statutes provide procedural protections demanding that those seeking to file a
lawsuit satisfy an increased burden to prove that they have a legitimate claim.148 These statutes provide targets financial relief in the
short term through a stay of discovery and in the long term through
the recovery of attorney’s fees.149 Anti-SLAPP statutes also shift the
burden onto the party filing the claim to support the claim’s validity
at an earlier stage in litigation, putting an early halt to additional
financial drain on the target’s resources.150 Moreover, anti-SLAPP
statutes give targets the right of immediate appeal should they fail
to successfully litigate their anti-SLAPP claim in the lower court.151
These provisions would seem to provide sufficient protection
from vindictive actors like Thiel, seeking to support potentially meritless claims through revenge litigation funding. But anti-SLAPP
statutes are not in force in every jurisdiction in the United States;
and recently, judicial decisions have eroded these protections by either questioning or prohibiting the application of state anti-SLAPP
statutes in federal court.152 The lack of uniformity in application of
144

See Roe, 543 U.S. at 84.
See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987).
146
See Bazelon, supra note 128. As outlined in Part II, Hogan discussed his
private life, including his sex life, extensively, both in interviews and in his own
tell-all book.
147
See Aaron Smith, SLAPP Fight, 68 ALA. L. REV. 303, 305 (2016).
148
Id.
149
See Carson Hilary Barylak, Reducing Uncertainty in Anti-SLAPP Protection, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 852 (2010); see also Smith, supra note 147, at 310.
150
See Smith, supra note 147, at 310.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 310–11. The First and Ninth Circuits have both granted defendants
in federal court the full procedural advantages of anti-SLAPP laws. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1024-26 (9th Cir. 2003); Godin v. Schencks, 629
F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 2010). However, the D.C. Circuit has ruled that anti-SLAPP
145
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anti-SLAPP protections across jurisdictions leads to forum shopping, where plaintiffs in anti-SLAPP law states can (and have) removed claims from state to federal court, where they have better
chances of avoiding protective procedural mechanisms.153 While a
federal anti-SLAPP statute, like that proposed by a bipartisan group
of representatives, would arguably resolve this problem, the likelihood of passing such a statute is unclear.154
Revenge litigation funding capitalizes on these legal vulnerabilities, while also playing on other, less quantifiable factors. As described herein, a growing discontent and mistrust of the media fuels
inflated jury awards like that seen in Bollea.155 In that case, a juror
reported that the $140 million award “wasn’t about punishment of
these individuals and Gawker. You had [sic] to do it enough where
it makes an example in society and other media organizations.”156
One public figure in particular has stoked these kinds of negative

motions directly conflict with the lower ‘plausibility’ standards of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328,
1333-37 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In Davide Carbone v. Cable News Network, a closely
watched case in the Eleventh Circuit, the Northern District of Georgia sided with
the minority view in an emerging circuit split on this issue. See Corey L. Andrews,
Are Anti-’SLAPP’ Statutes Toothless In Federal Courts?, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2017,
9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2017/02/24/are-anti-slapp-statutestoothless-in-federal-courts/#60c443cb4a2c. Siding with the D.C. Circuit view,
Judge Orinda Evans held that the standard for dismissal embodied in the federal
rules “relate[s] only to how a litigant may bring his claims to court and bear[s] not
at all on the substance of those rights or their enforcement.” Id. In the view of the
court, absent any violation of the Rules Enabling Act, the federal rules governing
dismissal are purely procedural and must be applied in federal court, regardless
of any additional protections granted by state anti-SLAPP statutes. Id.
153
See, e.g., Order at 2, Dean v. NBC Universal, No. 2011 CA-006055-B
(D.C. Super. Ct. June 25, 2012).
154
SPEAK FREE Act of 2015, H.R. 2304, 114th Cong. (2015). The bill has
enjoyed rare bipartisan support and has won praise from Silicon Valley titans and
free speech activists alike. See Eric Levitz, House Republicans Hope to Pass This
Bill Before Donald Trump Takes Office, N.Y. MAG.: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (June
1, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/06/gop-hopes-to-pass-thisbill-before-trump-wins.html. Nevertheless, the fate of the bill remains uncertain
in the current political climate. Id. As stated by the bill’s sponsor, Republican
Congressman Blake Farenthold, “Obama will sign this. I don’t think Trump will.”
Id.
155
See Bazelon, supra note 128.
156
Id.
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attitudes towards the press: President Donald Trump.157 Trump, who
has admitted to using intentionally abusive litigation tactics purely
for the sake of harassment,158 also threatened to “open up our libel
laws so when [journalists] write purposely negative and horrible and
false articles, we can sue them and win lots of money.”159 While this
threat is not a particularly frightening one when one stops to consider that (a) this is what our libel laws are already designed to protect against, and (b) the president has no direct power to change
these rules, Trump’s overt hostility towards the press reflects, and
perhaps inspires, the kind of ire that leads to outsized awards from
jurors.160
This litigious attitude and hostility towards the press prompted
many journalists to link Trump to their reports regarding the implications of Bollea.161 Trump has himself filed libel lawsuits at least

157

See Voters Divided, supra note 133.
See Bazelon, supra note 128. Trump was specifically quoted speaking
about a libel lawsuit he filed against former New York Times reporter Tim
O’Brien: “I spent a couple of bucks on legal fees, and they spent a whole lot more.
I did it to make his life miserable, which I’m happy about.” See Paul Farhi, What
Really Gets Under Trump’s Skin? A Reporter Questioning His Net Worth, WASH.
POST (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/that-timetrump-sued-over-the-size-of-hiswallet/2016/03/08/785dee3e-e4c2-11e5-b0fd073d5930a7b7_story.html?utm_term=.67938ee5601f.
159
See Nicholas Lemann, How Peter Thiel’s Gawker Battle Could Open a
War Against the Press, NEW YORKER (May 31, 2016), www.newyorker.com/
news/news-desk/how-peter-thiels-gawker-battle-could-open-a-war-against-thepress.
160
Some legal critics have suggested that a cap on damages akin to that employed in the United Kingdom would have prevented the “death” of Gawker. See,
e.g., Bazelon, supra note 128. There, jurors in libel cases operate under an unofficial damages cap of about £250,000. Id. Such a rule not only insulates British
publishers from the kind of fallout seen in Bollea, but also encourages retractions
and apologies by lowering the stakes of a potential libel lawsuit. Id. But caps on
damage awards in libel cases would not have been particularly effective in Bollea,
as the claims were brought on privacy grounds. Thiel’s assault on Gawker also
included claims related to a class action labor lawsuit for which Harder’s firm was
interviewing potential plaintiffs. See Drange, supra note 112. Moreover, as discussed herein, even in the absence of a jury award, the cost of legal fees for defending against these claims would have eventually been enough to bankrupt the
company. See Denton, supra note 85.
161
See, e.g., Katie Rogers & John Herrman, Thiel-Gawker Fight Raises Concerns About Press Freedom, N.Y. TIMES: MEDIA (May 26, 2016), http://nyti.ms/
158
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seven times, winning only once: when a defendant failed to appear.162 Lawsuits aside, Trump’s ongoing public attacks on the
press163 have contributed to the “chilling effect”—a phenomenon
that prevents journalists and news organizations from reporting on
plaintiffs with deep pockets or considerable power for fear of serious
reprisal.164 This threat is not lessened by the fact that the “chilled”
speech is accurate, of genuine public concern, or even within the
legal limits of libel and defamation. As discussed below, even meritless claims are a threat to the press when funded by vengeful actors.
The Threat of “Meritless” Claims and Death by a
Thousand Cuts
Much of the press coverage regarding Thiel’s financial backing
of Hogan’s case focused on the legality of his actions and the commonplace nature of third-party litigation funding in general.165 Commentators also tended to posit that this sort of tactic is not a foolproof
strategy.166 To be successful, the underlying claim must have
B.

1WnOTzP; see also Billionares’ Attack, supra note 128; see also Bazelon, supra
note 128.
162
See Bazelon, supra note 128.
163
Prior to entering public office, Trump famously called CNN “fake news”
following completely accurate and factual reports regarding potentially compromising information held by the Russian state. During the same press conference,
he referred to news website BuzzFeed as a “failing pile of garbage.” See Leonard
Downie Jr., Donald Trump’s Dangerous Attacks on the Press, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/opinion/donald-trumps-dangerous-attacks-on-the-press.html. Since taking office, Trump’s attacks on the press
have escalated to increasingly bizarre threats, culminating with a tweet in which
he threatened to “revoke” the broadcasting licenses of news organizations he disfavors. See Allison Michaels, Can President Trump Really Revoke Broadcast Licenses, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
post-politics/wp/2017/10/13/can-president-trump-really-revoke-broadcast-licenses/?utm_term=.73a47c2477c4
164
See Billionaires’ Attack, supra note 128.
165
See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Peter Thiel Is Wrong About the First Amendment, SLATE: JURIS. (May 26, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/jurisprudence/2016/05/should_peter_thiel_be_allowed_to_finance_
hulk_hogan_s_lawsuit.html. Stern’s article notes that third-party litigation funding is not unusual and is commonly employed in civil rights cases. Id.
166
Id.; see also Eugene Kontorovich, Peter Thiel’s Funding of Hulk HoganGawker Litigation Should Not Raise Concerns, WALL ST. J.: VOLOKH
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merit.167 One commentator reasoned that “to destroy a media company, it is not enough that litigation be financed. A court must also
find the defendant liable, award damages and have it sustained on
appeal.”168 Otherwise, the suits would be dismissed, or, in an extreme situation, an attorney bringing a frivolous claim would be subject to court sanction.169 These arguments echo the reasoning of
those voices championing the abandonment of the doctrines of
champerty and maintenance, who believe that the evolution of the
legal system and the development of ethical accountability rules
have done away with the need for these prohibitive laws.170
These observations ignore the reality of the current American
legal system. Granted, litigating a claim in the United States is more
costly than in any other country in the world171 and, all things being
equal, normal market forces theoretically prevent meritless claims
from wreaking havoc on the system.172 Because the costs of litigation mount quickly, parties with frivolous claims are hesitant to file
costly lawsuits with low probabilities of success.173 Attorneys who
might litigate cases on a contingency basis are equally unlikely to
take on the risk.174 In an effort to ensure a maximum return, most
third-party litigation funders employ vetting mechanisms that evaluate whether claims have a high probability of success.175 Logically,
CONSPIRACY (May 26, 2016), www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/05/26/peter-thiels-funding-of-hulk-hogan-gawker-litigationshould-not-raise-concerns/?utm_term=.1c3319353f24.
167
See Stern, supra note 165.
168
See Kontorovich, supra note 166.
169
See Stern, supra note 165.
170
See BURFORD CAP., supra note 43.
171
U.S. Legal System Is World’s Most Costly According to a New Study, U.S.
CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (May 14, 2013), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/us-legal-system-is-worlds-most-costly-according-to-anew-study.
172
See id.
173
See id.
174
See id.
175
See Randazzo, supra note 3. Litigation funders typically employ legal experts who analyze claims on the basis of potential success, taking into account
both evidentiary and legal elements, including the favorability of the venue and
jurisdiction. Some (like the Thiel funded start-up Legalist) have developed their
own internal algorithms that calculate the chances of success and even estimate
the time it would take to litigate the claim. See Biz Carson, One of Peter Thiel’s
Fellows Created a New Startup that Will Fund Your Lawsuit, BUS. INSIDER: TECH
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these kinds of litigation investors are typically uninterested in meritless, or even risky, claims; as such, it stands to reason that funders
do not increase the presence of such claims in the legal system.176
However, as seen in Bollea v. Gawker, the introduction of a thirdparty funder with no interest in pecuniary gain alters the judicial
ecosystem.177
A vengeful party like Thiel who intends to “bankrupt, buy or
wound”178 a media outlet is not constrained by the economic pressures that would prevent the filing of a meritless lawsuit. Notably,
our system sees each party covering the costs of its own representation (barring a specific state or federal law that says otherwise).
Therefore, the fact that a media outlet like Gawker is required to pay
attorney’s fees when attempting to dismiss or even respond to a
complaint means that a “successful” claim is not essential to exact
revenge.179 Instead, a funder can employ a strategy of death by a
thousand cuts180—providing litigation funds to any party with a
claim against their target, no matter how unlikely it is to succeed.
Through this method, success could be had through a cumulative or
aggregate effect, rather than the singular blow represented by Bollea
v. Gawker.
This is precisely the strategy Thiel likely intended to employ.181
While Thiel has not disclosed exactly how many other cases he financed,182 he admits that Hogan was not the sole beneficiary of his

INSIDER (Aug. 24, 2016, 2:05 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/legalist-willfund-your-lawsuit-if-it-thinks-you-have-a-good-shot-at-winning-2016-8.
176
See Carson, supra note 175.
177
See Bazelon, supra note 128.
178
See Denton, supra note 85.
179
See, e.g., Clara Jeffery & Monika Bauerlein, Why We’re Stuck With
$650,000 in Legal Fees, Despite Beating the Billionaire Who Sued Us, MOTHER
JONES (Oct. 23, 2015, 2:46 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2015/10/
why-wont-we-get-our-legal-fees-back [hereinafter Why We’re Stuck].
180
See Lili Levi, The Weaponized Lawsuit Against the Media: Litigation
Funding as a New Threat to Journalism, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 761, 785 (2017).
181
See Drange, supra note 112.
182
The most Thiel has been willing to disclose is that it is “safe to say [Bollea
v. Gawker] is not the only one.” Id.
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vendetta.183 Though Thiel’s backing of any particular case is unconfirmed, the firm he paid to represent Hogan has sued Gawker at least
five times since 2013.184
Among those lawsuits is a defamation case filed on behalf of
Shiva Ayyadurai, an Indian-American scientist who claims to “have
invented email.”185 Ayyadurai was the subject of an article by Sam
Biddle, who argued that e-mail was developed at least a decade before Ayyadurai claims to have invented it.186 Even though according
to many experts and historians, “[e]lectronic mail predates Ayyadurai’s ability to spell, let alone code,”187 Gawker settled the lawsuit
for $750,000 as part of the settlement with Hogan.188 Ayyadurai
claims to be “unaware of any behind-the-scenes financial arrangements involving [his] attorneys and anyone else.”189
Another claim litigated by Harder and settled alongside Hogan’s
was that of freelance journalist Ashley Terrill.190 Terrill sued
Gawker and Biddle for defamation after the site published an article
detailing her well-documented investigation into the dating application (“app”) Tinder and Terrill’s belief that she was being harassed

183

Id.
See id.
185
See id.
186
See Sam Biddle, Corruption, Lies, and Death Threats: The Crazy Story of
the Man Who Pretended to Invent Email, GAWKER: GIZMODO (Mar. 5, 2012, 2:50
PM), web.archive.org/web/20120306204240/http://gizmodo.com/5888702/corruption-lies-and-death-threats-the-crazy-story-of-the-man-who-pretended-to-invent-email.
187
See Mario Aguilar, Internet Pioneers Slam $750,000 Settlement for the
‘Man Who Invented Email’, GAWKER: GIZMODO (Nov. 4, 2016, 3:20 PM),
http://gizmodo.com/internet-pioneers-slam-750-000-settlement-for-the-man-178
8503950.
188
See id.
189
See Drange, supra note 112.
190
See Peter Sterne, Here Are All the People Suing Gawker, POLITICO: MEDIA
(June 15, 2016, 8:39 AM), http://www.politico.com/media/story/2016/06/hereare-all-the-people-suing-gawker-004601.
184
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by one of the app’s co-founders.191 Gawker’s offer of settlement to
Ms. Terrill amounted to $500,000.192
In a blog reflecting on the outcome of the litigation, Denton
wrote that Gawker “expected to prevail” in the lawsuits brought by
Ayyadurai and Terrill, and that he was “confident the appeals court
would reduce or eliminate the runaway Florida judgment against
Gawker.”193 Citing to Thiel’s own public commitment to “support
[Hogan] until his final victory” and to “gladly support someone else
in the same position,”194 Denton wrote that the threat of Thiel’s relentlessness and his tremendous financial capability motivated a settlement that would prevent “endless litigation.”195
Denton was not alone in his belief that Gawker would succeed
in its appeal of Hogan’s award.196 Given the rationale of Judge Whittemore197 and Judge Black,198 it would stand to reason that the outsized award in Bollea v. Gawker would not survive appellate scrutiny. But the financial reality of facing a foe with practically limitless resources presented a battle that Gawker could simply not afford
to continue fighting, no matter how likely its eventual legal vindication.199 To illustrate, Gawker’s legal fees for the Hogan case alone

191

See id.; see also Sam Biddle, Tinder Confidential: The Hookup App’s
Founders Can’t Swipe Away the Past, GAWKER (Nov. 23, 2015, 11:32 AM),
http://gawker.com/tag/ashley-terrill.
192
See Sydney Ember, Gawker and Hulk Hogan Reach $31 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES: MEDIA (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/
business/media/gawker-hulk-hogan-settlement.html.
193
See Nick Denton, A Hard Peace, NICKDENTON.ORG (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://nickdenton.org/a-hard-peace-e161e19bfaf#.odd4bp3um [hereinafter Hard
Peace].
194
See Peter Thiel, Peter Thiel: The Online Privacy Debate Won’t End with
Gawker, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION PAGES (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/08/16/opinion/peter-thiel-the-online-privacy-debate-wont-end-withgawker.html.
195
See Hard Peace, supra note 193.
196
See, e.g., Toobin, supra note 72.
197
See Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 8:12–cv–02348–T–27TBM, 2012
WL 5509624, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2012).
198
See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA
2014).
199
See Ember, supra note 192; see also L. Gordon Crovitz, Peter Thiel’s Legal Smackdown, WALL ST. J.: INFO. AGE (June 5, 2016, 5:47 PM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/peter-thiels-legal-smackdown-1465163232.
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totaled almost $10 million.200 Even without the breathtaking $140
million Bollea verdict, the site (which would have broken even without paying legal fees) was operating at a loss and initiating layoffs
to mitigate the cost of litigating cases, at least one of which was financed by Thiel.201 With Thiel showing no signs of abandoning his
vendetta against Gawker, and outside financing in the face of the
looming award unlikely, the site had little chance of survival. The
legal merit of any particular claim Thiel might seek to weaponize
against them was inconsequential—so long as Thiel was willing to
leverage the legal system as a means of bleeding Gawker’s finances,
his eventual victory was certain.
While some have dismissed Thiel’s third-party funded onslaught
against Gawker as an isolated incident, at least one other billionaire
also adopted Thiel’s so-called “philanthropic”202 approach to combating the press.203 In 2012, Idaho billionaire and Republican megadonor Frank VanderSloot filed a defamation lawsuit against the
magazine Mother Jones.204 VanderSloot claimed that Mother Jones
had defamed him by “falsely stating that Mr. VanderSloot ‘bashed’
and ‘publicly out[ed] a reporter.”205 VanderSloot, who has an extensive history of anti-gay-rights activism that included running a series
of ads attacking a gay journalist,206 has since changed his views on
LGBT issues, even writing an op-ed declaring his belief that “gay
people should have the same freedoms and rights as any other individual.”207 This evolution aside, the court found Mother Jones did
not defame VanderSloot, holding that all statements in the article
were “non-actionable truth or substantial truth.”208
That fact did not stop VanderSloot from litigating his claim for
more than two years, costing Mother Jones a reported $2.5 million
200

See Mac & Drange, supra note 96.
See id.
202
See Sorkin, supra note 9.
203
See Bazelon, supra note 128.
204
See Clara Jeffery & Monika Bauerlein, We Were Sued by a Billionaire Political Donor. We Won. Here’s What Happened., MOTHER JONES (Oct. 8, 2015,
8:51 PM), www.motherjones.com/media/2015/10/mother-jones-vandersloot-melaleuca-lawsuit.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id.
201
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in legal fees.209 Mother Jones’s insurance did not cover the entire
cost, leaving the magazine to pay a tab in excess of $600,000.210 And
because Idaho does not have an anti-SLAPP law,211 Mother Jones
could not recover its legal fees absent a finding from the judge (who
had already specified that VanderSloot’s case was not frivolous) that
the lawsuit was pursued “frivolously, unreasonably, or without
foundation.”212
Despite Mother Jones’s victory, VanderSloot had effectively
succeeded, not only by harassing the magazine and its staff, but also
by draining its resources.213 After his defeat, VanderSloot established the “Guardian of True Liberty Fund,”214 personally pledging
one million dollars to “help individuals who have been unfairly attacked by the liberal media mount a legal defense, the costs of which
can be overwhelming.”215 Where Thiel covertly limited his efforts
to toppling a specific site, VanderSloot widened the aperture, actively and publicly shopping for plaintiffs who would bring claims
against any and all liberal media outlets.216
VanderSloot’s own case, and his subsequent open call for
would-be plaintiffs, demonstrate that third-party litigation funding,
when employed by vindictive actors uninterested in pecuniary gain,
does in fact have the potential to weaponize even non-meritorious
claims. As such, lawsuits funded by Thiel and VanderSloot expose
the ongoing vulnerability and shortcomings of our modern legal system, where a party with the deepest pockets can drag on litigation
for years, papering the opposing side to death, no matter how baseless the claim.
The absence of a federal anti-SLAPP statute likewise ensures
that those interested in this style of revenge litigation funding are
free to forum shop. In other words, these revenge litigation funders
209

See Bazelon, supra note 128.
See Why We’re Stuck, supra note 179.
211
Anti-SLAPP statutes allow for swift removal of SLAPP cases out of court
and in many cases, require the plaintiff to pay a penalty that includes recovery of
the legal fees for the defendant. See Smith, supra note 147, at 310.
212
Why We’re Stuck, supra note 179.
213
Id.
214
GUARDIAN OF TRUE LIBERTY, http://melawebsites.com/gftlf/about/ (last
visited Sept. 30, 2017).
215
Id.
216
See id.
210
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are able to seek out claims in jurisdictions with the weakest protections for the press, where even a plaintiff’s loss in court will inflict
potentially fatal economic damage to a defendant news organization. Alternately, as in the case of Bollea v. Gawker, a plaintiff, perhaps swayed by the motives of his or her silent benefactor, may drop
claims typically covered by media insurers in an effort to exact as
much financial damage as possible in the event of a large award.217
As such, the modern “protections” afforded by the legal system and
ethics rules (and advocated by those who no longer see the utility of
champerty and maintenance restrictions) are not enough to neutralize the threat—even of non-meritorious claims—to the Fourth Estate.
C.
Champerty and Maintenance to the Rescue?
Despite the legal protections afforded to the Fourth Estate by
virtue of the Constitution and the American tradition of freedom of
the press, media organizations remain vulnerable to attack via revenge litigation funding schemes. Claims lobbed at the press and
financed by vindictive actors, whether with merit or without, are not
constrained by the typical market forces and judicial mechanisms
that would eliminate the potential financial peril posed by the threat
of persistent litigation. Contrary to the arguments of those who see
no practical use for the doctrines of champerty and maintenance, in
those jurisdictions that continue to apply the doctrine, there is some
hope that it might be used by media organizations to counteract attacks from those who would seek to silence them through these kind
of covert (or in the case of VanderSloot, overt) methods of funding.
As noted in Part I, states that apply the doctrines of champerty
and maintenance restrict the practice to varying degrees and tend to
approach their analysis as to whether an agreement is champertous
from a myriad of perspectives. But one thing that all such jurisdictions seem to disdain is the mere suggestion that a third party is behaving as an officious intermeddler. As reasoned by the Superior
Court of Delaware, an agreement is more likely to be deemed champertous or in violation of the maintenance doctrine if the third-party
“‘stirred up’ litigation” or has a controlling hand in the litigation

217

See, e.g., Toobin, supra note 72.

302

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:269

strategy.218 Moreover, courts are more likely to hold that a party is
an officious intermeddler and that an agreement is champertous
where the funder seeks out the claimholder (rather than the party
holding the claim seeking out the funder).219
Under this rationale, in a state with champerty and maintenance
restrictions, should a case arise that is funded by VanderSloot’s
plaintiff-shopping Guardian of True Liberty Fund, the defendant
could argue that the claims must be dismissed on the basis that the
third-party litigation funding agreement is champertous, and that
VanderSloot’s fund is operating as an officious intermeddler. These
arguments would be supported by the fact that VanderSloot “stirred
up” litigation by advertising an interest in suing a specific target:
liberal media outlets.
Moreover, a defendant news organization in Gawker’s position
might argue that a revenge litigation funder is an officious intermeddler if it can show that the funder is interfering in or influencing the
course of litigation. In Bollea, the moment to file a motion to dismiss
on this basis might have arisen at the point that Hogan’s legal team
dropped the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim—something that Gawker’s insurance would have covered.220
Though Harder would have argued that this was a tactical decision unrelated to any motives Thiel may have had, in a jurisdiction
with champerty and maintenance restrictions, Gawker’s attorneys
could have made the argument that this was evidence of Thiel’s actions as an officious intermeddler.221 As noted herein, the most logical inference drawn from elimination of the negligent infliction of
218

See Charge Injection Techs., Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., No.
NO7C–12–134–JRJ, 2016 WL 937400, at *1, *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2016).
219
See, e.g., id.
220
See Mac & Drange, supra note 96.
221
Evidence of this kind of behavior would also be a violation of multiple
ABA ethics rules, resulting in potential sanctions for the attorney. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 5.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A lawyer
shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render
legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment
in rendering such legal services”); see also id. at r. 1.8(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)
(“A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other
than the client unless: (1) the client gives informed consent; (2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship . . . .”).
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emotional distress claim would be that a party wanted to ensure that
any judgment would have to come directly from Gawker’s own
pockets, inflicting the maximum amount of financial damage possible. Bolstering this argument is the fact that Hogan rejected several
offers of settlement, only to eventually agree to accept a fraction of
the judgment awarded by the court.222
However, gathering enough evidence to support this kind of
claim would likely prove difficult. Barring discovery of communications between Thiel and Harder or Hogan that laid bare Thiel’s
meddling, or an explicit provision in the funding agreement that allowed for the funder to dictate legal strategy, it is unlikely that a
court would comfortably side with the defendant.
Moreover, decisions like that seen in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission223 continue to expand the definition of what
qualifies as speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.224
The kind of corporate political expenditure that was deemed protected in Citizens United could potentially be extended to cover the
expenses of a private citizen (or fund, in the case of VanderSloot)
seeking to support what he or she characterizes as public interest
litigation.225 In fact, Thiel cleverly characterized his funding of Bollea as public interest litigation,226 aligning himself with decisions
like NAACP v. Button, which protects third-party support of litigation that seeks the “vindication of constitutional rights.”227 The difficulty of drawing the line between a claim like that in Button and
that of a third-party actor with a personal vendetta would likely be
too amorphous for courts to unravel and properly administer. No
222

See Toobin, supra note 72; see also Mac & Drange, supra note 96.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The
case is notable for a ruling that protected unlimited corporate and union expenditures in election campaigns. Id.
224
Id.
225
See Bradley C. Tobias, Note, Officious Intermeddling or Protected First
Amendment Activity? The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Champerty Law After
Citizens United, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1293, 1318 (2014). In fact, the
motivation behind overturning champerty and maintenance restrictions in the majority of southern states during the civil rights movement was the desire to protect
the interests of plaintiffs in civil rights lawsuits, whose claims were typically supported by organizations like the NAACP. See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1287–88.
226
See, e.g., Toobin, supra note 72.
227
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 443 (1963).
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case has yet to test this theory of revenge litigation funding as
speech, but with the ongoing erosion of the champerty and maintenance restrictions as they apply to third-party funding, it is unlikely
that an appeal on these grounds will serve targeted media organizations much longer, if at all.228
What, then, might offer the most effective protection for organizations like Gawker, Mother Jones, and other targets of revenge
litigation funding? Besides the adoption of strong anti-SLAPP statutes on the state and federal level that could guard against the effectiveness of revenge litigation funding models,229 news organizations
(and the entities that support them)230 now find themselves in a position to push for increased regulation of third-party litigation funding, and amendments to the rules of discovery and evidence that
would allow for the disclosure of the identity of a third-party funder.
Regulations that media organizations should push for would include strict restrictions against funder interference in the attorney228
More importantly, Bollea was decided in a Florida state court, a jurisdiction that does not recognize champerty and maintenance restrictions. See Hardick
v. Homol, 795 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (holding that champerty and
maintenance are no longer viable causes of action in Florida). As such, an argument on these grounds would be unavailing.
229
For example, the Florida anti-SLAPP statute only protects against claims
arising in the context of a homeowner’s association dispute or from a lawsuit by
the government against a journalist or private citizen speaking out against its actions. FLA. STAT. § 768.295 (2015). If the Florida statute mirrored that of the
Washington D.C. statute, which is expanded to claims of almost any kind, perhaps
Hogan’s trial would have been halted before it even began. See D.C. CODE § 165502 (2012).
230
Ironically, Thiel supported one such non-profit organization, the Committee to Protect Journalists (“CPJ”). COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, https://
www.cpj.org/about (last visited Sept. 30, 2017). The CPJ is “an independent, nonprofit organization that promotes press freedom worldwide” and defends “the
right of journalists to report the news without fear of reprisal.” Id. Thiel provided
significant financial support to the CPJ from July 2008 to January 2013, but was
criticized by its Executive Director, Joel Simon, for “support[ing] efforts to abuse
the [legal system] by seeking to punish or bankrupt particular media outlets.” See
CPJ Reacts to Reports that Peter Thiel Has Funded Lawsuits Against Gawker,
COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (May 25, 2016, 1:09 PM), https://cpj.org/
2016/05/cpj-reacts-to-reports-that-peter-thiel-has-funded-.php. Other organizations that should join in an effort to defend against revenge litigation funding attacks on the media include the Media Advocacy Group, First Look Media’s Press
Freedom Litigation Fund, and the Society of Professional Journalists.
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client relationship during the course of litigation that mirror the
strong protections granted by the ethics rules. In addition, news organizations should propose proportional caps on return on investments in individual cases. This kind of regulatory cap would be most
effective in the case of a formal fund that operates under a “replenishment” scheme. In theory, a cap on the amount or proportion of an
award that a third-party funder is able to recoup from any given case
would temper a funder’s desire to push litigation forward beyond
the point where cases could reasonably settle and avoid the risk of
losing any return altogether. This theory assumes that a revenge litigation funder operating from a formal fund that relies on external
donations (like VanderSloot’s Guardian of True Liberty Fund)231
aims to replenish its funds with a percentage of the award from
claims it supports. On the other hand, a cap would prove ineffective
where a party is willing to part ways with as much of its resources
as necessary to exact revenge.
On the evidentiary front, it would be beneficial to media organizations to lobby for rules of civil procedure that would allow for the
discovery and disclosure of the presence of a third-party funder in
any given case. The discoverability of a third-party funding agreement would, at the very least, alert the defendant of potential ulterior
motives, possibly prompting the ability to file an anti-SLAPP claim
that would dispose of the controversy. Ideally, an evidentiary rule
that would benefit media organizations under attack from revenge
litigation funders would require the disclosure of any previous conflicts the third-party funder had with the defendants. Moreover,
should the defendant find an avenue of relevance that would allow
for the introduction of the presence of the third-party funder as evidence during the proceeding, jurors would be less likely to fall for
the kind of David vs. Goliath narrative crafted by plaintiffs like Hogan. This would, at a minimum, level the playing field for media
organizations by unveiling the presence of deep pockets.

231

See GUARDIAN OF TRUE LIBERTY, supra note 214.
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Appeals to lawmakers to protect the integrity of the press could
not come at a more crucial moment. President Trump’s general litigious attitude,232 declaration of “war with the media,”233 and habit
of disseminating false information234 make for a precarious combination in an era of skepticism towards the reliability of the press.235
On the one hand, the contentious political climate is a hotbed of
journalistic activity, especially as the presidential administration
struggles to keep its internal blunders under wraps.236 However, legal scholars have noted that “the libel climate is changing” and that
public figures are likely to capitalize on this moment, when they
“may be more confident that courts and juries will be sympathetic
to their claims.”237 If the result of this climate is a weakened Fourth
Estate that is hesitant to report the news for fear of backlash from
the powerful actors they are called to report on, the real costs will
be borne by an uninformed and more easily manipulated American
public.
CONCLUSION
From their inception, the doctrines of champerty and maintenance were developed to prevent “great men” from manipulating the
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vulnerability of an imperfect legal system to achieve their own nefarious ends and exact revenge on their rivals.238 The “great men”
of today are not feudal lords attempting to game the system with the
aim of aggrandizing their own estates or sullying their rival’s names.
Instead, they are vengeful actors, seeking to shield their own reputations and agendas from attack or criticism from the media, no matter how deserved or accurate the coverage might be. Revenge litigation funding affords these vindictive actors a means through which
to weaponize torts and inflict tremendous damage upon their targets,
even with claims that would not typically survive legal scrutiny.
While the underlying rationale that motivated the creation of
these restrictions would seem to align perfectly with the desire to
protect news organizations from attack by revenge litigation funders, the difficulties of drawing distinctions between these vengeful
claims and the kind of public interest litigation that advanced the
civil rights movement means that application or revival of the doctrine would likely be futile. Nevertheless, media organizations
would benefit by capitalizing on the lessons learned from the Bollea
v. Gawker/Thiel controversy and engaging with the third-party litigation funding industry at large to lobby for the implementation of
rules and regulations, of the kind outlined herein, to better insulate
them from these kinds of abusive litigation tactics in the future.
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